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Abstract 
The goal of this project was to validate the results of the Interagency Screening 
Tool created by the National Science and Technology Council Subcommittee on Critical 
and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains in order to improve its ability to detect for potential 
material criticality as tool helps to create policies that effect critical materials. We 
worked with the Office of Energy Policy and Systems Analysis in the Department of 
Energy to research historic cases of material market anomalies, that were compared the 
tool’s results, and used to find new avenues for determining potential material criticality. 
The gathered data allowed suggestions for the methodology, interface, and scope of the 
tool to be created into order to improve performance and usability of the tool. 
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Executive Summary 
Introduction & Background 
 As technological advances take place in society, the demand for raw materials 
with unique physical and chemical properties increases. Meeting this demand requires a 
dependable supply. However, markets for some materials periodically experience 
anomalies that can threaten supply reliability. Circumstances, such as these, can 
sometimes lead materials to be labeled as “critical”. In 2010, fueled by concern over 
supply for critical raw materials, the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) 
formed the Subcommittee for Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains. In 2016, the 
Subcommittee developed the “Interagency Screening Tool (IST)” as part of an early 
warning system that enables government entities, industry, and other organizations to 
take action to prevent or mitigate the impacts of material criticality.  
Criticality is a complex concept that means different things to different 
stakeholders. Thus, it is challenging to create a generalized approach which is effective 
for all the differing perspectives. In addition, there are many factors that impact 
criticality, such as demand growth, supply concentration, and substitutability. The 
problem with many of the factors involved in determining criticality is that they are not 
easily quantified. Even in cases where factors can be quantified, the data may be 
inaccessible or of questionable quality. The data is also often not reported on an 
ongoing basis - making regular assessment of criticality difficult. Because of these 
issues, the Subcommittee explicitly designed the tool to use publicly-available data that 
is updated annually to ensure that it can consistently calculate potential criticality. 
 
Methodology 
 The goal of this project was to evaluate and improve the IST’s ability to function 
as an early warning system by examining recent historical instances of material market 
anomalies and comparing them to the tool’s results.  
 Our first objective was to find historic cases of material market anomalies to test 
against the tool. This list of material cases was created through research including 
analysis of news articles in business and trade publications along with information from 
the United States Geological Survey’s Mineral Commodity Summaries, their special 
publications, and discussions with their commodity specialists.  
 Our second objective was to determine whether or not the tool captured the 
drivers behind each historical case of material market anomalies, and why. We explored 
methodological tweaks to demonstrate sensitivity of the tool to various assumptions as 
well as to relative weights of the indicators. 
 Our third objective was to create a set of recommendations for potential 
enhancements to the tool in order to enable it more effectively detect potential criticality, 
as well as expand the tool’s scope and improve usability. 
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Findings 
 Our analysis of historic market anomalies consisted of going through all seven 
materials and gathered the drivers behind each material as well as the years of each 
anomaly. Table 1 shows a summary of drivers of the observed material market 
anomalies. 
 
Material 
Anomaly 
 Years 
Supply Chain 
Disruption¹ 
Government 
Action² 
Market 
Dynamics³ 
Tool Detection 
Years 
Palladium 1999-2001   X 1996-2006 
Tungsten 2004-Present X X  
1999-2002, 
2004-2009, 
2011-2013 
Tantalum 2000-2001   X 2000-2005 
Tin 2007-2010 X X X NA 
Nickel 2006-2008   X N/A 
Tellurium  2008-2011   X N/A 
Rare Earths 2006-2013  X X 
2001-2003, 
2005-2013 
¹Any sudden changes to a supply chain without warning, including natural disasters, strikes, and military conflicts 
²Changes in government policy regarding material such as tariffs on imports and exports, mining subsidies, quotas on 
mining/production/exportation 
³Changes in the market including global recession, speculation by investors, supply not/barely meeting demand due to a delayed 
response or lack of minable source 
 
Table 1: Historic Cases of Material Market Anomalies 
 
 Overall, we found that the tool produced mixed results. With exceptions, the tool 
was quite able when predicting potential criticality for niche materials, but less so when 
looking more common materials. Looking at Table 1, the tool identified four of the seven 
tested materials as potentially critical, and of those four, three are fairly niche. Of the 
remaining three materials that were not detected, two are fairly common.  
After researching each anomaly, we assessed how well the tool captured the 
drivers behind each case. While examining the performance of the tool in detecting 
each case, we noticed that the market dynamics (M) indicator tended to lag behind the 
others and suppress the overall criticality indicator even if the other two sub-indicators 
were rising. In other words, M indicator would not go above the 0.335 threshold until the 
actual year of the anomaly, while the supply risk (R) and production growth (I) indicators 
would reach the threshold ahead of the actual year where C reached the threshold. 
 We attempted multiple methods to improve the functionality of the tool. First we 
looked at how the potential criticality (C) value changed if we removed the M indicator 
entirely from the equation, which caused some material market anomalies to be 
detected earlier than previously. However, this new equation did not have the same 
effects across all materials. The next method was to weight the indicators differently 
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using two different sets of weights, which focused on the weights of I and M while 
leaving R the same. These two equations would prove to be more effective in detecting 
the potential criticality earlier than just removing M from the equation entirely. 
  Another important methodological consideration underlying the tool is the default 
time period over which the M and I indicators are calculated. Varying the time period 
while looking at the effect on the potential criticality value demonstrated a clear 
sensitivity of the results to the assumed time period. Increasing the time window for both 
I and M to six years in comparison to the original five did allow for some of the materials 
to be marked as potentially critical earlier. 
 We combined the time window and weighting of the indicators into one equation 
which had the best results over the materials studied. This new equation predicted 
materials earlier as well as predicting materials that the tool had missed. Shown below 
in Table 2 is the summary of methodological analysis to the equation for calculating the 
potential criticality indicator. 
 
Material Original C 6 Year Period C without M 
Years Under 
Set1 
Years Under 
Set2 
Palladium 1999-2006 1998-2007 
1996-1999, 
2001-2007 1996-2008 1997-2006 
Tungsten 
1999-2002, 
2004-2013 1999-2013 1996-2013 1998-2013 1998-2013 
Tantalum 2000-2005 2000-2006 1998-1999 1998-2005 2000-2005 
Tin  2007 2006-2007 
1999-2007, 
2013 2007 
Nickel    2011-2013  
Tellurium    
19961998, 
2006, 2008  
Rare Earths 2006-2013 2001-2013 1996-2013 1996-2013 1996-2013 
Table 2: Summary Table of Methodological Changes 
 
Exercising the tool also revealed other areas for improvement that are not 
expressly methodological in nature, but nonetheless improve the usability and overall 
utility of the tool. For example, examination of materials that are precursors for other 
materials or that are linked via co-production or by-production was difficult with very few 
of these links expressly integrated into the tool’s user interface. 
 
Recommendations 
5.1: Methodological Improvements 
 We suggest a reevaluation of the default time period over which potential 
criticality is calculated given the sensitivity of the results. The default time period 
for the production growth (I) and market dynamics (M) indicators affects the results of 
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the tool. We looked at many different time periods of 1 year through 10 years (the 
default being 5 years) and analyzed both the overall potential criticality (C) value and 
the individual indicators to see how changing the time period affects the tool’s detection 
of potential criticality (C) value and individual indicators to see how changing the time 
period affects the tool detection of potential criticality. Overall, there is a clear sensitivity 
to the assumed time period. We found that a period of six years seemed to be most 
accurate in determining potential criticality.   
We suggest considering assigning relative weights to the sub-indicators.  
We found in many cases that the indicator for market dynamics (M) stays low 
until the anomaly occurs. The M indicator uses a measure of price volatility, but the 
price does not typically fluctuate until the anomaly has occurred, meaning that the tool 
can often will detect potential criticality later than the ideal time. We tried to correct this 
by changing the formula for C to weigh M less heavily and it showed positive results: 
detecting criticality earlier and in more cases.   
 
5.2: Interface Improvements 
We recommend that the colors for each country in the graph of production 
and price be standardized. Having a standard color for each color would make the tool 
easier to use. 
We recommend that the colors for the indicators for the graph of single 
commodities time series and indicator tables are consistent for each material. 
The current color disparity causes problems in comparison between multiple materials, 
and fixing this would allow more effective usage of the tool.  
 
5.3: Tool Expansion  
We suggest that the tool be expanded to include links between materials. 
There are materials that are linked through co-production, or as by-products which can 
contribute to material criticality. In addition, the tool includes both materials and their 
precursors in some cases, such as aluminum and bauxite, respectively. However, the 
tool does not make this link apparent. Including this information can allow for easier and 
more in depth analysis to occur of these materials in the tool.  
We suggest that the scope of the tool be expanded to include other 
materials such as isotopes, gases, and other chemical compounds. Information on 
these materials is widely available and many of these materials can be considered 
critical by their respective industry. The tool could cover these materials, and doing so 
would increase the tool usability. 
We suggest that contract pricing be noted in the tool. In some cases, 
research indicated that much of the buying and selling of raw materials occurs via long-
term contracts. It was not clear whether the price data in the tool takes this into account 
of only reports spot market prices. The tool would benefit from including contract pricing 
data which would allow analysis of certain materials to be easier. 
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5.4: Future Analysis Possibilities 
 Consider the usefulness of a ranked list comparing relative criticality 
values. The threshold value of 0.335 is arbitrary and does not reflect how criticality is a 
subjective concept. An idea we had come up with to fix this would be to report a chart 
that compared the potential criticality values, and even their sub indicators, creating a 
ranked list of the materials. These would remove the values from being the primary 
deliverable, which have the chance of easily confusing those who do not fully 
understand what they were looking at. The ranked list would also move focus to 
changes of ordering and the ordering year to year instead of the arbitrary value. More 
importantly, organizations and agencies could easily see how each material compared 
to others, which would make it easier to see which materials should have higher priority. 
 We suggest considering threshold values for the sub-indicators.  
The threshold for criticality is not a definitive value and was determined based 
upon research by the Subcommittee.  In some materials there is an indicator that is 
obviously approaching potential criticality, but not reflected by the overall C value.  We 
suggest that there be some way to account for this, such as a threshold for indicators as 
well as overall criticality. 
 We suggest looking into the addition of more sub-indicators. Sub-indicators 
would be able to point towards more underlying causes of criticality such as 
substitutability. Including these would allow for an easier understanding of what caused 
the potential criticality of the material. 
 
Conclusions 
 Overall we found the tool to be a very good indicator for potential criticality of 
niche materials based on the materials we studied. In most of the cases we examined, 
the tool detected potential criticality early and stayed above the threshold for the entire 
anomaly time period.  Many of the cases where criticality was not detected were 
common metals such as tin or nickel. Adjustments to the tool’s methodology has the 
potential to increase the tool’s ability to detect potential criticality and enhancement to 
underlying data and the user interface can help improve the tool’s usability and overall 
utility.   
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1. Introduction 
  
As technological advances take place in society, the demand for raw materials 
with unique physical and chemical properties increases. Meeting this demand requires a 
dependable supply. However, markets for some materials periodically experience 
anomalies that can threaten supply reliability. Circumstances such as these can 
sometimes lead materials to be labeled as “critical”.  
There is no universally agreed upon definition for “critical minerals”, because it 
typically depends on the end-use application. However, the National Science and 
Technology Council (NSTC) recently defined “critical minerals” as “those that have a 
supply chain that is vulnerable to disruption, and that serve an essential function in the 
manufacture of a product, the absence of which would cause significant economic or 
security consequence” (NSTC 2016). 
  In 2010, fueled by concern over supply for critical raw materials, the National 
Science and Technology Council (NSTC) formed the Subcommittee for Critical and 
Strategic Mineral Supply Chains (the Subcommittee) under the Committee on 
Environment, Natural Resources, and Sustainability. The Subcommittee is responsible 
for working with member agencies to detect and signal “emerging critical or strategic 
materials” (CSMC, 2016). In 2016, the Subcommittee developed the “Interagency 
Screening Tool (IST)” to help identify materials with a high potential for criticality, 
economy wide. Using indicators derived from publicly-available, regularly-published 
data, the IST flags materials on an ongoing basis that may warrant further investigation 
into sources of criticality. The main objective of this tool is to provide an early warning 
system that enables government entities, industry, and other organizations to take 
action to prevent or mitigate the impacts of material criticality. For example, efforts can 
be made to secure supply from other sources or to find alternative materials.  
 The goal of this project was to evaluate and improve the IST’s ability to work as 
an early warning system by examining recent historical instances of material supply 
anomalies and comparing them to the tools results. After identifying cases where the 
tool would have failed to detect supply issues, we consulted with material experts and 
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analyzed the tool’s underlying data in order to provide some recommendations for 
potential improvements.  
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2. Background 
 
This chapter explains the many factors that can lead to a material becoming 
critical and the reasons the tool was developed. This is accomplished by exploring 
different materials and why different agencies might consider different materials critical. 
In addition, we introduce the National Science and Technology Council and their 
Interagency Screening Tool. We explore why the NSTC created this tool, the 
methodology used by it, and the tool’s various uses. Finally, we explain our reasoning 
behind completing this research and how we conducted said research.  
 
2.1 Difficulties in Determining Criticality 
 
  There is no agreed upon definition or way of determining criticality. This is rooted 
in the fact that each group concerned with supply of raw materials has different 
interests, and therefore has wide-ranging perspectives on what should be labeled as 
critical. Materials that are vital to one industry may have no uses at all in another 
industry. For example, The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense have 
different definitions for critical materials. The Department of Defense defines critical 
materials as materials that are used to “supply the military, industrial, and essential 
civilian needs of the United States during a national emergency and are not found or 
produced in the United States in sufficient quantities to meet such need” (DOD 2015). 
As shown in Figure 2, the Department of Energy’s definition emphasizes the importance 
of the material to clean energy and the supply risk of the material (DOE 2011).  
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Short-Term (present-2015) Criticality Matrix                   Medium-Term (2015-2025) Criticality Matrix 
 
 
Figure 1: Short-term and medium-term criticality matrices for materials important to 
clean energy (DOE 2011) 
 
 Another dimension of complexity is the fact that there are a wide range of 
indicators that can be used to decide if a material is critical and most reports on material 
criticality consider different subsets of these factors, weighing each differently. In a 2015 
report, the University of Augsburg identified 18 indicators that have appeared in one or 
more criticality studies from various countries, ranging from the United States to UK to 
Germany. Each of these studies also followed their own methodology, and examined 
different time periods. These factors fall under three different categories: Vulnerability, 
Supply Risk, and Environmental Risk(Figure 1).  
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Figure 2: The Scope of Factors for Criticality Used in Various Criticality Studies, as 
Compiled by the Institute for Materials Resource Management, a subset of the 
University of Augsburg, in Augsburg, Germany (Mayer and Gleich 2015) 
 
 For the most part, factors that fall under the Vulnerability category, in Figure 1 
are the demand-side indicators of criticality. Many of them involve the material’s 
importance to various bodies, such as economies (Economic Relevance), militaries 
(Strategic Relevance), or technology (Emerging Technologies and Functionality & 
Technology). An important fact to note is that every factor that falls into this category 
also falls into the category of qualitative, so they don’t have values that can be directly 
reported, but must be explained with words, or else inferred using values that can be 
produced for related systems.  
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 Supply Risk refers to factors that fall more directly relate to a material’s supply 
chain, and not the bodies that are the endpoints of said supply chains. These factors 
include where the material is concentrated in the world (Geopolitical Concentration), the 
budget allotted to explore new uses of the material (Exploration Budget & Investment), 
and whether or not the material is a byproduct of another material’s production 
(Production as Byproduct). Also, as all of the factors under Vulnerability were 
qualitative, almost all of the factors under Supply Risk are quantitative. The exceptions 
are those factors which are split between two factors, and Production as Byproduct, 
which is primarily a yes or no question. 
 Environmental Risk is the easiest to describe, but the most difficult to see trends 
with. Simply put, it is the risk that the material and/or its supply chain will have a 
damaging effect on the environment. There are only two factors within this category: 
how much damage a material can have on the environment (Damage Potential) and 
how the material would affect climate change (Impact on Climate Change) (Mayer and 
Gleich 2015). 
 
2.2 NSTC and Its Approach to Assessing Criticality 
 
 
 The NSTC was created by Executive Order on November 23, 1993 as a means 
to coordinate technology and science policy across Federal research and development 
enterprises. Its primary objective is to establish clear national goals for Federal science 
and technology investments (NSTC 2016).  
 The Subcommittee on Critical and Strategic Mineral Supply Chains was created 
in 2010 by action of the NSTC Committee on Environment, Natural Resources, and 
Sustainability (CENRS). The purpose of the Subcommittee is to “facilitate a strong, 
coordinated effort across Federal agencies to identify and address important 
implications arising from critical and strategic mineral supply issues” (CSMSC Charter 
Art C, 2016). The Subcommittee works with the CSMSC member agencies to assesses 
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mineral criticality and mark emerging critical or strategic minerals. Another function of 
the Subcommittee is to assess domestic and global policies on critical and strategic 
minerals on the U.S. and analyze strategies for risk mitigation (CSMSC Charter Art C, 
2016). The Subcommittee also has a function to identify cross-agency opportunities in 
critical and strategic minerals and to coordinate research and development for 
alternatives to critical and strategic minerals (CSMSC Charter Art C, 2016).  
In order to assess criticality, the Subcommittee developed a two-phase 
approach. The first phase consists of the Interagency Screening Tool (IST), which 
attempts to identify potentially critical materials through early warning screening. The 
IST systematically analyzes an expansive list of raw materials using indicators related to 
the material’s supply risk, production growth, and market dynamics. The IST uses these 
indicators as they are qualitative and easier to track. 
 In the words of the NSTC, “The supply risk indicator aims to assess the relative 
risk of a supply disruption by quantifying the geopolitical concentration of a mineral’s 
production” (NTSC 2016). Simply put, supply risk measures the amount of uncertainty in 
a supply chain based upon the concentration of mining activity in a country, weighted by 
the instability of that country. This is done using two specific values: The Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI) and the Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) from the World 
Bank. The HHI typically is a measure that relates the number of firms within a market to 
the size of said firms in relation to the total market (US Department of Justice 2015), but 
in this case it is applied on a country-level instead of a company-level. The WGI is a bit 
more complicated. The WGI are a group of six indicators that each say something 
different about a government. These indicators are 1) Voice and Accountability, 2) 
Political Stability and Absence of Violence, 3) Government Effectiveness, 4) Regulatory 
Quality, 5) Rule of Law, and 6) Control of Corruption. However, the indicator used in 
calculating supply risk is a composite of all six (NSTC 2016). For a more detailed 
description of the WGI see Appendix A. The point of these indicators is to provide a 
quantitative and unbiased method of analyzing the stability of countries which supply 
these materials. An unbiased opinion is formed by “30 individual data sources produced 
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by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, non-governmental organizations, 
international organizations, and private sector firms” (Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). 
 The production growth indicator aims to “capture trends related to a mineral’s 
market size by quantifying recent changes in its global primary production” (NSTC 
2016). This indicator was calculated by looking at the primary production of the material, 
provided by the USGS, over consecutive years using a variable time which defaults to 
five years. The production growth indicator is important because the growth of a 
materials production often hints at an increase in demand on the global scale. 
 As the market dynamics indicator is currently, “The market dynamics indicator 
aims to capture the robustness of the mineral to sudden market changes by quantifying 
its price volatility” (NSTC 2016). In short, it is an indicator of how easily a material’s 
market is able to react and recover to sudden and potentially drastic changes in the 
global market. 
 The Subcommittee intentionally kept the methodology simple and straightforward 
so it could be transparent and repeatable. The Subcommittee also intentionally 
designed the tool to only rely on publicly-available data that is published regularly and 
on an ongoing basis. This allows the results from the tool to be easily updated.  
It is important to note that this tool does not determine criticality as a final 
decision; rather, it lets the user know which material is possibly at risk and alerts them 
to do a more in-depth analysis of said material (phase two). When the tool’s criticality 
value goes above the “critical threshold,” this does not automatically mean that the 
material is critical, it just signals that it should be looked at more closely. The IST is the 
first step in determining the criticality of a material. If a material has been identified as 
potentially critical by the IST, it moves along to the second stage of the process, which 
is an in depth analysis of the material (NSTC, 2016). The goal of the in-depth analysis is 
to use reports and market trends to assess the impacts that a loss of a critical material 
would have on our economy and security as well as focusing on specific materials for 
further analysis and research (NSTC 2016). 
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2.3 Project Goals 
 
As co-chair of the Subcommittee, the Department of Energy is interested in 
exploring ways to enhance the IST to more effectively flag potential criticality. 
Our goal was to validate the results of the IST as well as recommend potential 
enhancements to the tool. This goal was accomplished by examining how well the IST 
detected historic cases of material market anomalies. The results of this examination 
were used to validate the methodology of the tool as well and to identify ways the tool 
could be improved to capture the dynamics relevant to these cases.  
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3. Methodology 
 
 The goal of the project was to validate the IST and to develop recommendations 
for improvements. This section includes descriptions of the research methods used to 
reach this goal: 
● Identify the drivers of historic cases of material market anomalies  
● Examine why the tool did or did not detect these drivers 
● Make recommendations for enhancements to the tool 
 
3.1 Identify the Drivers of Historic Cases of Material Market Anomalies 
 
Our first objective was to determine cases of material market anomalies that 
impacted the reliability of supply for that material. In identifying these cases, we did not 
use the tool’s results or underlying data in order to avoid potential bias. First, we created 
a preliminary list of materials, the markets of which have experienced anomalies of 
various types in the last twenty years. The preliminary list was created by looking 
through multiple news articles that discuss anomalies. These anomalies range from 
supply chain disruptions and price spikes to government legislation blocking the trade of 
certain goods. After documenti what kind of anomaly occurred, the primary reasons for 
the anomaly, and the time period over which the anomaly occurred, this information was 
corroborated through research into the USGS mineral commodity summaries and 
special publications over the last 20 years.  
 Different types of materials and different anomalies were sought out in order to 
effectively test the tool. The increased variety allows multiple facets of the tool to be 
tested and analyzed for any shortcomings and strengths. The variety of materials and 
anomalies also reflects the complexity of the real world which the tool needs to be able 
to analyze. 
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 The initial list was then cut down to seven potential materials by removing any 
material not in the IST. Each material needed to be in the tool in order to be used to 
validate the results of the tool. For the materials not in the tool, another list was created 
to show how the scope of the tool could be expanded. For example, molybdenum-99m 
was not in the tool, but it is very important for the medical industry and shows historic 
cases of market anomalies.  
The second half of the first objective was to expand upon researched knowledge 
of the materials that were chosen to test the tool. The expansion of knowledge was 
done in order to gain a deeper understanding of why these materials had an anomaly. 
Further research on each material allows for more insights behind the anomalies which 
in turn allows for greater analysis of the tool. The research might bring up underlying 
information that was not present in the mineral commodities summaries or the news 
articles. The information also allowed for stronger cases for each material in the final 
presentation. 
 An important aspect of this phase was to talk with experts in each of the 
identified materials. Therefore, several discussions with USGS mineral commodities 
specialists were set up. These discussions provided deeper insight into the historical 
market dynamics of each material in these interviews.  
3.2 Examine Why the Tool Did or Did Not Detect These Drivers 
 
The application of the tool to each material was used to determine whether it 
detected each case of material market anomalies. When tool was applied to each 
material, the material was identified as being potentially critical or not over the full 
spread of available data from 1996 to 2013. If the tool succeeded in identifying a 
material as potentially critical, then the material data from the tool was analyzed to see 
how it relates to the information we collected during the first step of the methodology. In 
the other case, where the tool failed to detect the historic market anomaly, the tool’s 
data was analyzed further in order to make recommendations for enhancements. 
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3.3 Making Recommendations for Enhancements to the Tool 
  
In the final objective, a set of recommendations for the IST and the NSTC were 
created. These recommendations were created to improve the tool’s ability to act as an 
early-warning screening tool. In addition, recommendations regarding expansion of the 
tool and interface improvements were made in order to increase its usefulness. These 
recommendations were presented with findings and analyses to our sponsors and 
members of the NSTC Subcommittee. The written recommendations along with the 
report were also shared with our sponsors and the NSTC Subcommittee.  
  
 13 
 
4. Findings 
 
Through the news article search over the last 25 years, we created a list of 
historical anomalies. Our original list consisted of tellurium, helium, rubber, nylon, 
silicon, plutonium, aluminum, iron, rosin, acrylic acid, carbon black, titanium dioxide, 
nitrocellulose, lithium, cement, sawdust, steel, iron, molybdenum-99m, 
bauxite/aluminum, manganese, and indium tin oxide. The list was eventually narrowed 
to seven materials, with rare earths as a comparison: tellurium, tantalum, tungsten, tin, 
nickel, and palladium, based on USGS yearbooks, USGS Mineral Commodity 
Summaries, and factors that we find from our further research on the materials. 
Indium tin oxide, sawdust, cement, nitrocellulose, rosin, acrylic acid, carbon 
black, titanium dioxide, plutonium, rubber, molybdenum-99m, and nylon did not have 
data in the tool, and were not studied. However, this provides a list of materials the tool 
could be expanded to include if additional data became available.  
Each of the seven materials on the final list were further analyzed to determine 
the drivers behind their historic cases of market anomalies 
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4.1 Historic Cases of Material Market Anomalies 
 
Palladium 
 
 
Figure 3: Price and Production of Palladium from 1990 to 2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
 Palladium, illustrated above in Figure 3, is a platinum group metal (PGM) 
primarily used in the production of catalytic converters which allow toxic byproducts 
from the combustion of hydrocarbons to be broken down into less harmful compounds. 
Palladium’s only effective substitutes are the other PGMs which react in very similar 
ways, but are generally more expensive. 
  In 2001, the price of palladium spiked due to an increased demand from the 
automobile industry as well as a supply chain disruption from the primary supplier, 
Russia (USGS 2010). During this time, 73% of the global demand for palladium was 
accounted for by the automobile industry according to Johnson Matthey, specialty 
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chemicals maker (Shumsky 2014). In the years immediately before 2001, the US placed 
more stringent limits on the amount of hydrocarbons automobiles can emit, leading to 
an increased use of palladium for catalytic converters to reduce automobile emissions. 
Over the course of 2000, palladium prices rose drastically due to worries that the 
escalating conflict between Russia and the Ukraine would prompt supply disruptions. 
Since Russia accounted for over 40% of the world’s supply of palladium at the time, the 
possibility of a disruption was viewed as a global disaster (Shumsky 2014). As Russian 
stockpile and production data for PGMs are a state secret, there was much uncertainty 
as to the Russian supply during this time. The data available on this stockpile are 
inferences and estimations based upon information such as Russian exportation 
numbers. 
 After palladium’s peak in 2001, its high price led automobile manufacturers to 
substitute palladium for currently cheaper PGMs such as platinum and rhodium, 
decreasing demand for palladium, returning pricing to their original levels (USGS 2010). 
The high price of palladium also lead to research into non PGMs that could be used in 
catalytic converters such as copper and nickel. Shown in Figure 4, is the prices of the 
PGMs from 1993-2008. Ultimately, the research concluded that there were no 
substitutes nearly as effective as the PGMs in the field of hydrocarbon emission 
reduction (USGS 2002). As prices decreased in 2003 due to an excess in supply as well 
as liquidation of palladium stocks by investors, automakers switched back to palladium 
for catalytic converters (USGS 2004).  
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Figure 4: Price of Platinum Group Metals 
 In January 2008, African platinum mines were shut down for five days due to 
electricity generation shortages. The shutdowns incited a fear of platinum supply 
shortage causing the price of all PGMs including palladium to rise drastically, although 
not as drastically as it did previously. The prices of PGMs fell back down because 
mining resumed and demand decreased during the 2008 economic downturn. In 2009-
2010, average palladium prices rose higher than those of 2008 again due to an 
increased demand from the resurging automotive industry (USGS 2010). In 2012 
palladium’s use in the auto industry rose to an all-time high due to an increase in 
Japanese vehicle production in response to the March 2011 earthquake and tsunami 
(USGS 2012). Around this time, auto sales shot up due to the need for replacement of 
cars damaged in the earthquake. Palladium continued to have a strong demand and 
tight supply due to its rarity into 2013, making palladium the only platinum group metal 
which experienced an average annual price increase in 2013 (USGS, 2013).  
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Tungsten 
 
 
Figure 5: Price and Production of Tungsten from 1990 to 2013 (NSTC 2016) 
  
 Tungsten is the chemical element with the highest melting point and it is often 
alloyed with other metals to strengthen them (Emsley 2011). Tungsten is primarily used 
in industrial alloys, drill bits, blades, and abrasives due to its high wear resistance and 
melting point (USGS 2004). In particular, tungsten carbide is extremely durable and is 
very important to the drilling, mining and oil industries (Emsley 2011). There are few 
substitutes to tungsten with the exception of molybdenum, titanium, and ceramics but 
none of these are capable of being used in higher temperature applications than 
tungsten.  
  Historically, the price of tungsten has fluctuated greatly depending on the 
economic, political and social status of China, the main supplier of this ore. Tungsten is 
not traded via any of the traditional methods such as the London Metal Exchange; 
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instead sales are arranged by traders and consumers (USGS 2010). Any prices 
published by trade journals are just estimates based on information derived from these 
traders and consumers, thus the potential for bias cannot be excluded when examining 
this material.  
 By 1994, most of the production of tungsten was concentrated in China, and the 
Chinese mines were not producing at high rates due to relatively low prices of tungsten 
concentrates. Later in 1994, demand for tungsten began to rise because as the world 
economy improved, tungsten was being used much more often in the manufacturing 
industry, leading to a sharp increase in the price of tungsten concentrates (Maby, 1995). 
Consequently, governments such as Kazakhstan, China, and Russia increased mine 
production, and released a large amount of tungsten from their tungsten stockpiles. By 
1996, the market was flooded with tungsten and prices dropped again (Bunting, 1997).  
 Up until 1999, prices continued to decrease due to high production of tungsten, 
and China began to increase their consumption of tungsten which continued through 
2010. In early 1999, China listed tungsten as a metal under state protection, imposing 
restrictions on mining, export, and processing (Huang 2009). These restrictions began 
with stricter control over their domestic tungsten industry in order to “ensure supplies to 
meet anticipated domestic demand” (USGS 2010). They accomplished this goal over 
the next 12 years by “closing illegal mines; limiting the number of exploration, mining, 
and export licenses; limiting or forbidding foreign investment; imposing constraints on 
mining and processing; establishing quotas on mine production and exports; adjusting 
export quotas to favor value-added downstream materials and products; and shifting 
from export tax rebates to export taxes” (USGS 2010). Between 2000 and 2001, 
tungsten concentrate prices increased partly due to Chinese regulations, and was 
exacerbated by panic buying and consumer stockpiling (USGS 2010).  
 In 2004, China ceased the exportation of tungsten concentrates in order to 
provide supply for their domestic industry. There were also droughts in the southeastern 
regions of China which caused energy shortages, affecting mine output. Additionally 
China closed mines for other environmental reasons and withdrew of mining subsidies. 
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All of these factors led to a steep increase in global tungsten prices and a tripling in the 
prices of tungsten concentrates.  In response to these high prices, there was an 
increased interest in opening new mines and finding new sources of tungsten by 
countries outside of China. Around 2007, as a result of the increased production of 
tungsten, prices lowered but never quite returned to their pre-2000 prices. This lowering 
in price was also aided by the economic downturn having a significant impact on the 
global economy in 2008. 
 
Tantalum  
 
 
Figure 6: Price and Production of Tantalum from 1990 to 2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
Tantalum is primarily used in capacitors due its heat and corrosion resistance. 
There are substitutes for tantalum capacitors such as silicon capacitors, but they are not 
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as effective and were not commonplace in the early 2000s. However, tantalum also has 
uses in medical technology, metalworking tools, and jet engine components, and for 
these applications, columbium, aluminum, ceramics and platinum can be used (USGS 
2001). 
In 2000, there was a large spike in tantalum prices. This resulted from a double 
and triple ordering of tantalum in 2000, due to a perceived upcoming shortage in supply 
(USGS 2012). The increased ordering led to beliefs that demand was increasing, 
reinforcing speculation that supply would not meet demand, especially from the 
booming electronic industry. The fact that the expected shortage did not come to 
fruition, combined with a weaker-than-expected demand from the electronics market, 
downturn in global economy, and increased tantalum inventories led to the price falling 
back down (USGS 2002).  
More recently, in 2008, three companies that were responsible of one half of all 
tantalum ore production stopped production (USGS 2012). This led to another price 
spike. Tantalum that came from the Congo became more prevalent. However, the 
mainstream industry looked for a way to ban the usage of this illegal mining. The 
economic and financial problems in 2008 and 2009 caused 40 percent of all tantalum 
production to shut down as well (USGS 2012). 
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Tin  
 
 
Figure 7: Price and Production of Tin from 1990-2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
 Tin is an element which has multiple uses ranging from electronics to 
transportation. Tin has multiple substitutes depending on the application, including 
aluminum, glass, and other alloys. However, the substitutes generally are not as 
effective and/or are more expensive (USGS 2008). 
 Price spikes began in 2007 when the top two global producers of tin, China and 
Indonesia faced shortfalls. Shortfalls began in China with difficulties obtaining feedstock 
for their smelters (USGS 2009). Then in 2012, China experienced shortfalls in 
production because of mine disasters and flooding (USGS 2012). In 2012, Indonesian 
mines experienced shortfalls because the Indonesian government raised the standard 
purity of tin produced in Indonesia, which forced Indonesian factories to decrease 
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production as they upgraded their smelters. There was also a government crackdown 
on illegal production sites in Indonesia. There was also increased global demand 
resulting from the replacement of lead with tin in multiple applications. In 2016, 
Increased production of tin as well as decreased demand from China led decrease to 
the decrease in tin prices (USGS 2016). 
  
Nickel  
 
 
Figure 8: Price and Production of Nickel from 1990-2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
 Nickel is a transition metal element. Nickel’s most common application is in 
stainless steel production, with addition demand stemming from its use in engines, and 
in hybrid batteries,. Potential substitutes for nickel include aluminum, steels, plastics, 
titanium alloys, and lithium. Nickel allows for more efficient engines due to its ability to 
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withstand stress at high temperatures. In addition, nickel is used to created light-weight 
alloys for use in vehicles. 
Starting in 2006, nickel prices began to rise as supply struggled to meet demand. 
This was due to an increase in nickel-metal hydride battery and stainless steel 
production, while new mines were still under construction and not operational. Demand 
for nickel was high in 2006, due to high quantities of steels and other alloys being 
produced, and spot prices for refined nickel were historically high in early 2007, due to 
low stockpile levels at the beginning of the year (USGS 2005-2008). The price spike 
also had to do with increased demand for more efficient engines which made use of 
nickel alloys. The price dropped in late 2007, as demand lowered due to recycling of 
stainless steel scrap. Use of nickel decreased with the rise in prices with nickel being 
substituted with cheaper materials 
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Tellurium  
 
 
Figure 9: Price and Production of Tellurium from 1990 to 2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
 Tellurium is a semiconducting metalloid element. It is produced as a byproduct of 
the refining of copper. Around 80-90% of the world’s tellurium comes from copper 
anode slime electrolysis. The main use of tellurium is high purity tellurium for electronic 
applications, and solar panels make up 40% of global consumption of tellurium (USGS 
2011). Tellurium’s other application are its usage in semiconducting alloys to improve 
machining alloys. Substitutes for tellurium include bismuth, phosphorus, selenium, 
sulfur, and calcium.  
As thin-film solar panels hit mainstream production in 2008, the price of tellurium 
spiked dramatically as demand hit never-before-seen levels at the same time Peru, 
major producer of tellurium, decreased output significantly as it was not economically 
feasible for production. In 2012, the combination of the end of tax rebates for solar 
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panels in Europe, and the growth in availability of cheaper silicon-based cells 
substantially lowered demand for tellurium (USGS 2012). As a result, prices fell back to 
pre-2008 levels. 
 
Rare Earths 
 
Figure 10: Price and Production of Rare Earths from 1990-2013 (NSTC 2016) 
 
 Rare earth metals are a group of elements that have a wide range of uses 
including chemical production, alloys, petroleum refining, automotive catalytic 
converters, glass and ceramics, and electronics. The DOE has already researched and 
covered rare earth metals in great detail. In our report and analysis, it serves as an 
effective baseline and is good for comparison purposes.  
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While consumption of rare earth metals fluctuated, from 2000 until 2012, the 
trend of usage increased overall. This trend is mostly due to their extensive use in the 
production of catalytic converters, permanent magnets, and rechargeable batteries for 
electric and hybrid vehicles. Rare earths faced short domestic supply from 2001 to 
2007, because of the closure of a separation plant in Mountain Pass, CA. During this 
period, domestic consumers of rare earth metals relied heavily on imports. The price 
rose even more rapidly from 2010 to 2012, caused by decreasing worldwide supply and 
increased demand (USGS 2000-2012). This decrease in worldwide supply was due 
mainly to restrictions on export of rare earth metals in China, the main producer of rare 
earths, in an attempt to increase the availability of such materials to internal companies.   
Common Trends and Drivers 
 
 While many materials have been researched in this project, each with its own 
origins and uses, there have been some trends and causes of anomalies that have 
appeared in multiple instances. 
In many cases there was a disruption of the material’s supply chain. Supply 
Chain Disruptions, as we call them, are sudden changes to supply chain without 
warning, such as due to natural disasters or military conflicts. Natural disasters such as 
hurricanes or droughts are often impossible to predict and even harder to prevent. They 
can result in the closing of mines such as in the case of tungsten where Chinese mines 
shut down in 2004 due to a drought causing a disruption in energy production.    
One driver that we saw with a few different materials was a situation where a 
government’s actions having an effect on a material’s market. We refer to this driver as 
Government Action.  For example, China’s tariffs and quotas on tungsten caused a 
generally higher price over a long period of time. Government action can have long 
lasting effects on a material’s market, causing many different outcomes.  
 In several cases, the development of a new technology or expanded use of an 
existing technology caused demand for a specific material to increase, putting strain on 
the supply chain. We refer to this as Market Dynamics. Examples of this are tellurium's 
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use in thin film photovoltaic cells and palladiums use in catalytic converters. In the case 
of tellurium, companies then overcompensated for demand, resulting in the market 
being flooded causing several producers to shut down or go bankrupt. There were also 
instances where perceived shortages, based purely on speculation, had real world 
repercussions as was the case with tantalum. Shown below in Table 3, is an overview 
of all the material market anomalies studied, with their years of anomaly, and their 
causes of potential criticality. 
 
Material Anomaly 
Years 
Supply Chain 
Disruption1 
Government 
Action2 
Market  
Dynamics3 
Palladium  1999-2001   X 
Tungsten 2004-Present X X  
Tantalum 2000-2001    X 
Tin 2007-2010 X X X 
Nickel 2006-2008   X 
Tellurium 2008-2011   X 
Rare Earths 2006-2013  X X 
¹Any sudden changes to a supply chain without warning, including natural disasters, strikes, and military conflicts 
²Changes in government policy regarding materials such as tariffs on imports and exports, mining subsidies, quotas on 
mining/production/exportation 
³Changes in the market including global recession, speculation by investors, supply not/barely meeting demand due to a delayed 
response or lack of minable sources 
Table 3: Historic Cases of Material Market Anomalies 
 
4.2 Analysis of Tool Performance 
 
To test the performance of the IST as an early warning screening tool for 
potential material criticality, we compared the seven cases of material market anomalies 
described in Section 4.1 against the results of the tool and examined reasons why the 
tool did or did not detect these anomalies.  To counteract any identified shortcomings, 
several methodological adjustments were tested. This included varying the time period 
over which potential criticality is calculated as well as the relative weights of each 
indicator.     
Important note: To determine whether a material is potentially critical or not, a 
threshold value of 0.335 was calculated and used by the NSTC. With our changes in the 
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methodology, that threshold would change as well. It is also important to say that the 
conclusions reached are only true for the materials represented here. Further analysis is 
needed to see if these changes hold true for all of the materials represented in the IST. 
 
4.2.1 Current Performance of the IST 
 
 
Material 
Anomaly 
Years 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
Palladium 
1999- 
2001 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.4 0.36 0.27 0.24 0.23 0.27 0.28 0.27 0.28 
Tungsten 
2004- 
Present 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.4 0.52 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.41 0.4 
Tantalum 
2000- 
2001 0.17 0.41 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.4 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.28 0.24 0.26 
Tin 
2007- 
2010 0.16 0.18 0.19 0.2 0.2 0.24 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.28 0.22 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.23 
Nickel 
2006- 
2008 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.15 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.18 0.2 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.2 0.22 0.19 
Tellurium 
2008- 
2011 0.2 0.16 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.3 0.27 0.26 0.27 0.26 0.25 
Rare 
Earths 
2006- 
2013 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.45 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.58 0.54 0.48 
 
Table 4: Summary of Criticality Values for Historic Cases of Material Market 
Anomalies (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
 As the IST is currently, it is quite able to detect potential criticality, or at least see 
it as it occurs, for fairly niche materials. As shown in Table 4, the IST recognized 
potential criticality in four out of seven of the historic cases of material market 
anomalies. Of these four, three (palladium, tantalum, and rare earths) would be 
considered very niche. The fourth, tungsten, is fairly ubiquitous because of its ability to 
strengthen alloys. This exception is likely due to tungsten’s lack of suitable 
replacements, as well as the fact that its primary producer is China. The IST did not 
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detect potential criticality for tin, nickel, and tellurium. Both tin and nickel are fairly 
common metals, but tellurium is not.  It has a fairly niche application within the 
electronics and solar cell markets. The reason for this exception is likely that it has 
several substitutes, allowing the market to better cope with rapid changes in supply and 
demand. (NSTC 2016) 
 A major note to make about that IST is that, for the cases that we looked at in 
which the tool recognized potential criticality, it was just as likely to detect the potential 
criticality before a market anomaly as it was to not recognize the potential criticality until 
the anomaly occurred. Looking again at the four cases of material market anomaly that 
the IST recognized, two of them were identified just as the anomaly occurred, and the 
other two were detected ahead of time.  
 The last major observations of the IST’s results is on how long it reports potential 
criticality, and how consistently. The IST has the tendency to report potential criticality 
long after the anomaly has been corrected. In the cases of palladium and tantalum, the 
IST continued to report potential criticality for five and four years, respectively, following 
the end of the market anomaly. These extensions can be fairly detrimental, because 
they would suggest that more time, money, and effort needs to be put into observing 
these materials than necessary. Conversely, the IST can also report gaps in potential 
criticality, suggesting, in cases like tungsten, that the material can be ignored and more 
money, time, and effort can be spent on other materials. 
4.2.2 An Analysis of Indicators 
 
 Through an analysis of the individual indicators that influence the potential 
criticality (C), several observations were made that could help solve some of the issues 
noted in Section 4.2.1. As a brief reminder, these indicators are R, the supply risk 
indicator (geopolitical concentration of production), I, the production growth indicator, 
and M, the market dynamics indicator (price volatility). R measures supply risk by using 
the WGI and HHI to calculate a value that both shows a country’s stability and its 
concentration of a material’s production market. I uses primary production growth over 
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five years to calculate a value for how much the material’s production has increased. M 
uses price data over five years to calculate a value that represents how volatile a 
material’s price is. All of these indicators are then normalized between 0 and 1. 
 
Figure 11: Tantalum Indicators, 1996-2013 (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
 Tantalum provides an excellent example of the observations that were noted 
regarding the indicator variables, shown Figure 11. Tantalum’s market anomaly began 
in 2000, and the IST was only able to report potential criticality starting in the same 
year. After looking at the indicators, it is clear that the I indicator increased by nearly 3 
times in the years preceding, and the R indicators remained low but consistent. The M 
indicator is where a problem can be found. M increased by an enormous amount, but 
only starting in the year that the anomaly occurred. As stated before, M is the market 
dynamics indicator, which is measured using price volatility. As price hikes usually occur 
when a market anomaly actually happens, and not before, the volatility doesn’t increase 
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until the anomaly occurs. For tantalum, because M was so low before the anomaly, and 
it jumped so high when the anomaly occurred, the C value is forced to follow the trends 
introduced by the M indicator. Thus, despite the I value being fairly high before the 
anomaly, the potential criticality does not break the threshold until 2000.  
Figure 12: Palladium Indicators, 1996-2013 (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
  When looking at palladium, see Figure 12, it is obvious that it is another example 
of M playing catch up. For palladium, I begins high, and then continues to rise. M, on 
the other hand, begins fairly low and then rises. In 1999, when the C value breaks the 
threshold for potential criticality (0.335) I had simply reached a high enough point for it 
to counteract the low M. However, that is not the most import thing to note about M for 
palladium. If one followed the general trends of M, and compared those trends to the 
trends of the C value, there is a distinct similarity between them. The trends of I have an 
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effect on C, usually raising the C value, but M still seems to have a stronger effect on 
the final C values. 
 
Figure 13: Rare Earths Indicators, 1996-2013 (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
 Rare earths provide an interesting example, which can be seen in Figure 13, and 
is being included specifically because the IST has already been proven efficient for this 
case (NSTC 2016). For rare earths, R has a much larger value than the other indicators. 
This should drive the C value up, which it does, but doesn’t have as much of an impact 
on the trends of C as one might think. Just as it was with palladium and tantalum, the 
trends of the C value seem to be very similar to the trends of M indicator. In this case, 
however, it doesn’t drag it down like it had with others. The R value is simply too high 
for that to happen. 
 From these three examples, it’s clear that M has too strong of an impact on the 
final C value, typically suppressing it until the material market anomaly occurs. If one 
 33 
 
was to look at the indicators besides the C value, it can be observed that the I indicator 
is usually high or rising preceding a material market anomaly. However, the M indicator 
is usually stable and very low at any time other than during an anomaly. Among the 
seven cases of historic material market anomalies, the low M indicator was able to 
cancel out the I indicator almost completely, resulting in the IST not reporting potential 
criticality until the anomaly has already occurred. Of course, the R indicator affects this 
statement, because, as it was with rare earths, if the R indicator was high enough the 
IST would still be able to report the potential criticality. 
 
4.2.3 Recalculating C 
 
 After going over the results of the analysis of indicators, we decided that the best 
method to attempt to remedy the issues that we observed was to change the relative 
weights of the indicators. As a reminder, C is currently calculated using the geometric 
mean of the three indicators, or 𝐶 = √𝑅 ∗ 𝐼 ∗ 𝑀
3
.. When using different weights with 
the geometric mean, the calculation becomes the weighted geometric mean, or 𝐶 =
(𝑅𝑊1 ∗ 𝐼𝑊2 ∗ 𝑀𝑊2)1/∑ 𝑊𝑁
3
1 The first thing we tried was removing M. This is the same as 
applying a weight of zero to M, resulting  in 𝐶 = √𝑅 ∗ 𝐼. Then, we tried using two full 
sets of weights, with Set 1 being w₁=1, w₂=4, and w₃=¼, and Set 2 being w₁=1, w₂=2, 
and w₃=½. These weights were chosen for their simplicity and because they would 
show trends that could then be used to justify further experimentation. As we had 
observed that I generally was more helpful when looking for potential criticality and M 
was not, we decided that for these two sets we would increase the weight on I by the 
same factor we would decrease the weight on M.  
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Figure 14:  Alternative C Calculations for Tantalum, 1996-2013 (Data source: 
NSTC 2016) 
 
 As tantalum was our strongest example when showing how M negatively 
impacted the potential criticality value, we have chosen it as the prime example for the 
changes in the calculation of C as well. From looking at the comparison of the results of 
our modified weighting with the original C value (Figure 14), the effects are more than 
evident. When M was removed entirely, the C indicator value only once broke the 
threshold for potential criticality, but that year is two years before the period of anomaly. 
So, while it was not overly beneficial, we were able to remove the detrimental trends 
that M introduced. The two other sets of weights proved much more interesting. For the 
second set of weights, where we increased the weight on I and decreased the weight on 
M by 4, the IST would be able to detect the anomaly period two years in advance. The 
trends of the M indicator are still evident, but the effect of them has been significantly 
reduced. For the third set of weights, where we increased the weight on I and 
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decreased the weight on M by 2, the IST would have been unable to report potential 
criticality before the anomaly period, but the weakening of the effect of M on C is 
evident. 
Figure 15:  Alternative C Calculations for Tin, 1996-2013 (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
 We chose tin as an example because it was not reported as potentially critical by 
the IST at all. It got very close in 2007, the first year of the anomaly period, which is 
shown in Figure 15. When we removed M from the calculation, however, the IST would 
have been able to report potential criticality in 2007, which is better but still not ideal. 
The other sets of weights proved to be much better. In the case of tin, the second set of 
alternative weights worked too well. Under alternative 2, the IST would report potential 
criticality for every year available, except for 1996 and 2012. While a false positive is 
significantly better than a false negative, that is simply far too many years in comparison 
to the number of years of anomaly. In this case, alternative 3 provides better results. 
Under alternative 3, the IST would have been able to detect potential criticality as early 
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as three years prior to the period of anomaly. However, the period of potential criticality 
would have ended before the period of anomaly did.  
 
 
 
Figure 16:  Alternative C Calculations for Rare Earths (Data source: NSTC 2016) 
 
 Rare earths provide one of the more interesting cases when we modified the 
calculation of C, see Figure 16. Rare earths is one of only two materials, the other being 
tungsten, that had the potential criticality increase more dramatically by removing M 
then by applying one of the other sets of weights. However, it can still be said that all 
three methods were identically effective. Under all three of the changes to the 
calculation of C, rare earths would have been reported as potentially critical by the IST 
from 1996 to 2013. This is because of how high the R value of rare earths is, as was the 
case for tungsten. When M has its weight lowered, and especially so when it is 
removed, the high R value takes over the calculation, increasing the C values by a large 
amount.  
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Material Anomaly Years Original IST 
Alternative 1 
(R=1, I=1, M=0) 
Alternative 2 
(R=1, I=4, M=1/4) 
Alternative 3 
(R=1, I=2, M=1/2)  
Palladium 1999-2001 1999-2006 
1996-1999, 2001-
2007 1996-2008 1997-2006 
Tungsten 2004-Present 
1999-2002, 2004-
2009, 2011-2013 1996-2013 1998-2013 1998-2013 
Tantalum 2000-2001 2000-2005 1998-1999 1998-2005 2000-2005 
Tin 2007-2010 2007* 2006-2007 1999-2007, 2013 2007 
Nickel 2006-2008   2011-2013  
Tellurium 2008-2011 2008*  
1996-1998, 2006, 
2008  
Rare Earths 2010-2012 2006-2013 1996-2013 1996-2013 1996-2013 
Detected 
Before 
Anomaly 
Years 
Detected After 
Anomaly Years 
or Not at All 
Detected During 
Anomaly Years 
 
*Very Close to Threshold 
Table 5: Summary of Impact of Alternative C Calculations 
 
 On the whole, changing the weights of the indicators seems to have a beneficial 
effect on which years the IST would report as potentially critical. As shown in Table 5, 
each of the changes would cause at least one material that the IST initially reported 
during the anomaly period to be reported early. In addition, each of the three changes 
caused least one material that was initially not reported at all to be identified by the tool. 
Based on observations of how many materials reported as potentially critical during their 
anomalous period, changing the weights to alternative 2 performed the best - only 
Nickel was not accurately detected. However, many of the periods of potential criticality 
began long before the period of anomaly, and would not be helpful.  
 There are important facts to note. The sets of weights and methods shown above 
are not concrete values. They are simply sets of weights that we chose, as experimental 
values, to show how the changes in the calculation of C could affect the years of 
reported potential criticality for the seven materials we examined. There would have to 
be a significant amount of work done to find the ideal weights across all materials that 
appear in the tool. Also, as stated at the beginning of this section, the threshold value 
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was chosen through an analysis of the initial C values. As such, changing the method 
by which C is calculated would also change the threshold value. 
 
4.2.4 An Analysis of Time Period 
 
 Another key feature of the calculation of C is the time period over which the M 
and I indicators are calculated. The IST currently reports C values that are calculated 
using a period of five years by default. We decided to see if that was the best time 
period to use by incrementally adjusting the number of years. We then looked for 
periods of time that would cause material market anomalies to be detected earlier than 
they were initially, preferably by 2 or 3 years, and that single year holes between 
periods of potential criticality would not exist so as to avoid causing unnecessary 
confusion. In addition to looking at how the final C value was affected by the period, we 
also looked into how the individual I and M indicators were affected by the changing 
time period. 
 
Figure 17:  Impact of Time Period on I Indicator for Palladium 
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Figure 18: Impact of Time Period on M Indicator for Palladium 
 
 
 On the whole, changing the time period did not cause the IST to report any 
materials as potentially critical that were not at least close to the threshold of 0.335. 
Changing the time period did, however, report materials earlier. This is true for 
palladium, for example. For palladium, the I indicator followed a fairly simple pattern 
when we changed the time period, see Figure 17. If the time period was increased, the I 
indicator increased, and if the time period was decreased, then I decreased. This is 
because palladium, for the most part, has had its production increasing since 1996. So, 
as the time period was increased, the production growth had a larger difference to 
calculate over, and thus higher production growth values were reported. As can be seen 
in Figure 18, M is quite different. Yes, it can be claimed that M increased as the time 
period did, but it wasn’t that simple. As the time period changed for M, the trends in the 
reported values changed. As the time period decreased, the values from year to year 
tended to jump up and down, as there were less years to calculate how much the price 
changed over. When the time period was increased, M values tended to flatten out, 
maintaining a relatively similar value for many years. This is because when more prices 
are used in the calculation of M, it is more likely large price spikes or dips are included. 
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Even if the price had been stable for many years, if the time period is long enough to 
included pricing data from when it wasn’t, the M value would be reported high. 
 
 
Figure 19: Impact of Time Period on C Indicator for Palladium 
 
Period 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
5 
Years 0.25 0.26 0.32 0.35 0.37 0.39 0.36 0.36 0.37 0.4 0.36 0.27 0.24 
6 
Years  0.27 0.34 0.36 0.44 0.42 0.39 0.39 0.38 0.4 0.41 0.36 0.27 
Table 6:  C Values for Palladium with 5 and 6 Year Time Periods 
 
For palladium, when the time period was increased, so did the C values, with the 
reverse also being true. However, there was a limit to the effectiveness of increasing the 
time period. As the time period got longer, it began to reach further back than it had 
data available for. Because of this, it would report 0 values. This is hard to see in Figure 
19, as the lines start when the 0 values end. It can be seen more clearly in Table 6. 
Changing the time period to six years allows the IST to report palladium as potentially 
critical a year earlier than normal, two years prior to the anomaly year, see Table 6. It 
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also balances the data atrophy that occurs as more and more blank spaces begin to 
appear in the charts. 
Figure 20: Impact of Time Period on I Indicator for Tungsten 
 
 
Figure 21: Impact of Time Period on M Indicator for Tungsten 
 
For tungsten, the I and M indicators follow very similar trend to palladium, but the 
same settling trend that was previously noted in the M value can be noted in tungsten’s 
I indicator, see Figure 20. It is true that as you increase the time period, the I value 
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increases, but the amount it increases by goes down with every year. This also holds 
true for M, which can be seen in Figure 21. 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Impact of Time Period on C Indicator for Tungsten 
 
Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5 Years 0.34 0.36 0.36 0.38 0.32 0.4 0.52 0.48 0.41 0.46 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.41 0.4 
6 Years 0.36 0.38 0.38 0.39 0.34 0.4 0.56 0.53 0.47 0.46 0.47 0.41 0.36 0.41 0.42 
 
Table 7: C Values for Tungsten with 5 and 6 Year Time Periods 
 
 Tungsten provides an example of the other criteria we were looking for in our 
analysis of year, see Figure 22. When the time period is increased, the gaps that 
appear at 2003 and 2010 are no longer present, which can be seen in Table 7. Values 
above the 0.335 threshold before 2004 could be viewed as a very long period of false 
positives, as the anomalous period we decided upon hadn’t occurred yet. As with 
palladium, a time period of six years provides what we were looking for. That is, an early 
warning to the material anomaly and that one year gaps were removed. As the time 
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period increases beyond six years, those gaps are reintroduced along with 0 values 
appearing on the chart. 
 
Figure 23: Impact of Time Period on I Indicator for Rare Earths 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Impact of Time Periods on M Indicator for Rare Earths 
  
 In the case of it’s I and M values, rare earths are more difficult to explain than its 
C values. I still maintains the qualities that were mentioned previously: As the time 
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period increases, so does I, as well as the reverse, and that as the time period gets 
larger, the increase from year to year gets smaller, see Figure 23. M, however, is more 
difficult to find a trend for. For the majority of the time between 1996 and 2013, the M 
values that are produced when the time period is changed are very similar. As shown in 
Figure 24, they cluster so tightly that it is difficult to determine trends. This is because 
the price of rare earths remained so constant for so long that no matter how you change 
the time period, it doesn’t include any price values that increase M. 
 
 
Figure 25: Impact of Time Period on C Indicator for Rare Earths 
 
 
Period 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
5 Years 0.31 0.31 0.36 0.39 0.38 0.32 0.34 0.45 0.45 0.5 0.5 0.52 0.58 0.54 0.48 
6 Years 0.35 0.34 0.38 0.38 0.42 0.4 0.36 0.45 0.46 0.51 0.51 0.56 0.65 0.58 0.56 
 
Table 8: C Values for Rare Earths with 5 and 6 Year Time Periods  
 
 When it comes to C values, changing the time period of rare earths has both 
effects we desired when we started looking at the time period, which can be seen in 
Figure 25. When the time period is increased, IST reported potential criticality as far 
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back as 1999, and the single year gap in 2004 no longer appeared. For rare earths, 
these changes are maintained all the way up to a nine year time period, and the only 
reason why is it not so in 10 is because there was not enough data to calculate 1999. A 
period of six years, however, provides that data with as little detail lost and as few 
calculations missed due to lack of data as possible, see Table 8. 
 
 
Material 
Determined 
Years 
Original IST, 5 
years 
Original IST, 6 
Years 
Palladium 1999-2001 1999-2006 1998-2007 
Tungsten 2004-Present 
1999-2002, 
2004-2009, 
2011-2013 1999-2013 
Tantalum 2000-2001 2000-2005 2000-2006 
Tin 2007-2010 2007* 2007 
Nickel 2006-2008   
Tellurium 2008-2011 2008*  
Rare Earths 2010-2012 2006-2013 2001-2013 
Before 
Determined 
Years 
After 
Determined 
Years or Not at 
All 
Matching 
Determined 
Years 
*Very Close to 
Threshold 
Table 9: Summary of Calculations 
 
 Overall, what is shown is that both raising and lowering the time period have their 
benefits. When the time period is lowered, it is much easier to view the year to year 
details that are lost when the time period is expanded. When the time period is 
increased, the small events that aren’t overly important can be balanced out so that a 
more general trend may be formed. From what we observed, and can be seen in Table 
9, raising the time period to six years was the most beneficial when looking at the 
materials we chose with market anomalies. The IST tended to detect potential criticality 
earlier, and covered up smaller gaps that would have confused reports.  
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 It should be briefly mentioned, once more, that the threshold value of 0.335 
would not be the correct value to use, as it would change with the C values. 
 
 
4.3 Other Improvements 
 
 Over the course of our project, we researched many materials, not all of which 
ended up on our list of seven cases of material market anomalies.  Nonetheless, the 
research process helped identify opportunities where including some additional 
functionality in the tool could be useful for analyses related to material criticality.  For 
example, including contract pricing information, co-production and byproduct 
information, and expansion of materials included in the tool would all be beneficial 
upgrades.  The price of manganese is closely related to the price of manganese alloy 
production through the use of contract pricing. Having information in the tool on contract 
pricing as an indicator or as some visual aid would allow for easier analysis of materials 
that have contract pricing.  After studying bauxite and aluminum, we realized that since 
bauxite was a precursor to aluminum, both materials would be linked. In the current 
state, the tool does not have information on materials that are precursors of other 
materials, or are by-products of the production of other materials. 
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5. Recommendations 
 Our recommendations fall under three categories. The first are possible 
improvements to the methodology of the tool, or more specifically, reexaminations of 
how the final value of C is calculated. The second are possible interface improvements, 
and the third are expansions to the scope of the model. The third are expansions to the 
scope of the model 
 
5.1: Methodological Improvements 
 
Consider of alternative relative weights for sub-indicators. In most of the 
cases we examined, the value of M suppresses the overall criticality until some material 
anomaly actually occurs, which is not helpful. In an attempt to fix this, we tried three 
alternative weighting structures that increased the impact of I and reduced the impact of 
M. An overall increase in potential criticality values was observed, which in turn leads to 
earlier detection of potential criticality. Of course, if this method was actually chosen, 
more than two set of weights would need to be tested against all of the materials in the 
tool. 
 Consider methodological modifications that take into account the tool’s 
sensitivity to the time period over which production growth and price volatility 
are calculated. The period of time over which sub-indicators I and M are calculated is 
five years. Through our work, we raised and lowered the time period in an attempt to 
see its effect on the final criticality values (see Appendix E). We even found what 
happens when we vary what time period is used between I and M, seeing if there was 
some unequal combination that allowed C to be more accurate in detecting material 
anomalies (see Appendix F). We looked for time periods that notice the year of material 
market anomaly earlier and time periods that covers any single year gaps between 
periods of potential criticality. For these purposes, we found that a time period of six 
years worked quite well. However, this change did not have a universal effect on all the 
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materials studied. Furthermore, this time period may not work for the rest of the 
materials in the tool. 
 
5.2: Interface Improvements 
 
We recommend that the colors for each country in the graph of production 
and price be standardized. Currently, the changing colors on indicator graphs makes 
comparison between multiple materials confusing. Each country having a standard color 
allows for easier comparison between the materials. Since this tool is intended to be 
used by the general public, the interface should be as streamlined as possible and be 
consistent in its coloring in order to increase the ease of use.  
 
We recommend that the colors for the indicators for the graph of single 
commodities time series and indicator tables are consistent for each material. 
Currently, the value of an indicator can be the same for two materials but be 
represented as two different colors. The difference in colors make it harder to quickly 
understand if a material is flagged as potentially critical in a given year or compare 
values across materials. Changing all the colors to have the same color scale would fix 
this issue. 
  
5.3: Tool Expansion  
 
Consider expanding the IST to include links between materials. Including the 
links between materials like bauxite and aluminum would expand knowledge relating to 
the possible causes of potential material criticality. This could be accomplished by 
combining the graphs of the two materials, or just including a note on each material 
showing that it is linked to another material. Relationships between materials may not 
be clear and require more research, so the model having these relationships would 
save time and resources of agencies who may use the model. Other relationships that 
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would need to be noted would be co-production, where materials are mined together 
and then extracted through a shared process, and by-products, where the mining, 
refining, and or processing methods of a primary material result in another secondary 
material being produced as well. It would be very useful to have a visualized form of 
these precursor, co-production, and by-production relationships in the tool. In addition, a 
connection within the tool between a material and its precursors would allow for easy 
cross reference between them and, therefore, reduce effort for finding cause-and-effect 
events.    
 
We suggest that the scope of the tool be expanded to include other 
materials such as isotopes, gases, and other chemical compounds. Information on 
isotopes and key chemical compounds would allow their respective industries and 
agencies to able to detect any potential criticality. An example of this is molybdenum-
99m, an isotope of molybdenum that decays into technetium-99, which is prominently 
used in medical imaging technology. Other materials that it would beneficial to track, 
indium tin oxide, sawdust, cement, nitrocellulose, rosin, acrylic acid, carbon black, 
titanium dioxide, plutonium, rubber, and nylon. All of these materials were identified in 
our search of new sources, but do not appear in the tool.  
 
Consider adding contract pricing information to the tool. Another important 
factor we noticed was the lack of data on materials sold through annual contracts. The 
unique part about contract-based materials is that their price does not react in 
accordance with demand because the price is set. If a material is mainly sold through 
contract, then the data for its pricing may no longer be accurate. Therefore, including 
some indication as to whether or not a material is sold mainly via contract in order to 
give insight on their potential criticality.  
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5.4: Future Analysis Possibilities 
 
 Consider the reporting results in the form of a ranked list that compares 
relative criticality values. The threshold value of 0.335 is arbitrary and does not reflect 
how criticality is a subjective concept. An idea we had come up with to fix this would be 
to report a chart that compared the potential criticality values, and even their sub 
indicators, creating a ranked list of the materials. These would remove the values from 
being the primary deliverable, which have the chance of easily confusing those who do 
not fully understand what they were looking at. The ranked list would also move focus to 
changes of ordering year to year. More importantly, organizations and agencies could 
easily see how each material relevant to their interests compared to others. 
 
 Consider creating additional sub-indicators. This suggestion would require 
further analysis, as what factors may be helpful additions seem to vary from material to 
material. Some analysis of what potential factors would be beneficial to the most 
materials would be vital. From our research we found several examples to use as a 
starting point of that analysis. First and foremost, an indicator of substitutability. A 
material that is vital but easily substituted is not as critical as one that has no 
substitutes. An example of a material that has no substitutes would be tungsten. As said 
previously, there are no materials that have similar properties to tungsten that are 
capable of withstanding the same temperatures tungsten can. Another possible 
indicator would be a measure of price elasticity of production. At the moment there is a 
measure of price volatility, but this factor doesn’t take into consideration how production 
responds to that volatility, which could be a good indicator of delays in the supply 
chain’s response to market signals. 
Consider creating a threshold for each individual sub-indicator. We noticed 
throughout our research that some sub-indicators sent signals of potential criticality 
before the overall C indicators did. Therefore, it might be worth considering setting a 
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threshold for the sub-indicators. For many materials that don’t pass the threshold in 
criticality, one or more of their sub-indicators are quite high during and before periods of 
supply anomaly. If a threshold point was set for the sub-indicators as well as the 
criticality value, it is possible that the methodology need not be changed to the same 
extent, as materials missed because of their criticality value may still be looked into 
because of one of their sub-indicators. 
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6. Conclusions 
  
 We examined many factors about how the Interagency Screening Tool 
determines potential criticality as well as what factors it has missed. We went about this 
by locating materials that were included in the tool, but had interesting and unique 
problems. This does a good job to make sure that the tool catches all fringe cases, but it 
does nothing to ensure that there are no false positives. False positives are actually a 
lot better than the tool missing potential cases of criticality because the tool is meant to 
be an early warning. Overall, we think that this is the best strategy because it reduces 
missed cases, even though it will take more time to work through the extra cases.  
Ideally, we would be able to test all of the materials, including those which were 
actually caught by the tool. This would provide a complete and thorough validation of 
the tool. By only examining seven materials, we may have over fit our recommendations 
or missed some cases, but we chose the most unique and varied cases that we were 
capable of completing in our time frame of seven weeks. Therefore, a good course for 
further research to take would be to test a wider range of materials against the tool and 
see if they come to similar conclusions as we did.  
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Appendix A: Worldwide Governance Indicators 
The worldwide indicators were developed by the World Bank to categorize and analyze 
multiple countries. It measures the quality of governance in multiple countries from over 
40 data sources updated every year since 2002. The result of this study by the World 
Bank is the worldwide indicators. 
The worldwide indicators range over multiple factors. Voice and Accountability 
“reflects perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens are able to participate in 
selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, 
and a free media”(Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). Political Stability and Absence of 
Violence/Terrorism “reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the government will be 
destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, including politically-
motivated violence and terrorism”(Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). Government Effectiveness 
“reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and 
the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation 
and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such 
policies”(Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). Regulatory Quality “reflects perceptions of the ability 
of the government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that 
permit and promote private sector development”(Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). Rule of Law 
“reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the 
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”(Kaufmann D. et 
al. 2010). Control of Corruption “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power 
is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well 
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests”(Kaufmann D. et al. 2010). 
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Appendix B: Chart of Agency Specific Criticality  
From 2016 GAO Report 
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Appendix C: Indicator Values by Material, 1996-2013 
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Appendix D:  Alternative C Calculations by Material 
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Appendix E: Charts of C by Material, with Varying Time 
Period
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Appendix F: Charts of I and M by Material, with Varying Time 
Period 
 
 73 
 
 74 
 
 75 
 
 76 
 
 77 
 
 78 
 
 
 
 
